The promotion of regional environmental security and Africa's common position on climate change

 Werner Scholtz
 BA LLB (Potchefstroom), Dr jur (Leiden)
 Professor of Law, Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, South Africa; Research Associate, South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law; Associate, African Centre for Disaster Studies
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 Edition: AHRLJ Volume 10 No 1 2010
  Pages: 1 - 25
 Citation: (2010) 1 AHRLJ 1-25
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Summary

The African continent is vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. Climate change poses a serious threat to peace and security on the African continent since it may, for instance, result in competition for and conflict about scarce resources. The capacity to adapt may reduce potential conflict, but there are various constraints on the capacity of African countries. Thus, support for climate change adaptation is essential. Africa may increase their adaptive capacity through international negotiations, but African states lack the resources to pursue this goal. The African Union has therefore facilitated the establishment of a common African position on climate change aimed at international climate change negotiations. Accordingly, the main aim of the article is to discuss the pursuit of the enhancement of adaptive capacity and therefore environmental security of African states through Africa’s common position on climate change.

1.  Introduction

All of Africa is very likely to warm during this century … The warming is very likely to be larger than the global, annual mean warming … [1] The continent of Africa is warmer than it was 100 years ago. [2] During the twentieth century, an average warming of 0,5 degrees Celsius has occurred on the continent. Climate variability and change will have profound effects on water accessibility and water demand, the agricultural and health sectors, energy use, coastal zones, tourism, settlements, infrastructure, and aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. [3] The African continent, in particular the sub-Saharan region, is the most vulnerable of all regions to the consequences of climate change. [4]  Climate change may have various negative consequences on the African continent. The effects of climate change may hamper the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals [5]  and the development of African states. [6]  It is also becoming clear that the effects of climate change threaten the enjoyment of a range of human rights, such as the rights to life, adequate food, water, health, adequate housing and self-determination. [7]  Thus, climate change may contribute to the further marginalisation [8]  of the African continent.

The African contribution to climate change is negligible since most African states’ emissions are low. African states had contributed merely 3,6 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions by 2000 and the per capita contributions from most African states remain small. [9]  An exception is South Africa, [10] which has one of the highest emissions in the developing world. [11] It is therefore evident that Africa has not contributed significantly to the threat that it faces.

Climate change also poses a serious threat to peace and security on the African continent since it has the potential to exacerbate competition and conflict concerning scarce natural resources. [12]  The capacity to adapt may reduce potential conflict. However, various constraints on the adaptive capacity of African states exist, such as poor governance and underdevelopment. The limited capacity of African states to respond to climate change, coupled with the dependence of citizens on natural resources [13]  for their livelihood, makes it essential for African states to access assistance for climate change adaptation. Adaptive capacity and adaption thus emerge as critical areas for consideration on the continent. [14]  The fact that African states have not contributed to the problem therefore does not imply that African states may remain passive. African states are among the most vulnerable and have the most to lose. Thus, capacity building pursuant to adaptation can contribute to the prevention of further insecurity on the African continent.

African states can pursue adaptive capacity through international negotiations with developed states. Individual African states, however, lack the capacity and bargaining power to pursue their interests at climate change negotiations. The African Union (AU) as a regional organisation has facilitated co-operation pursuant to a common African position on climate change with the goal of strengthening the voice of the African continent pertaining to negotiations. The Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP 15), [15]  for instance, presented the African continent with an opportunity to articulate a common position on climate change, which has the potential to pursue adaptive capacity and therefore further environmental security.

It is accordingly the aim of this article to discuss the pursuit of the enhancement of adaptive capacity of African states through a common position on climate change. The first section of the article reflects briefly on the international climate change regime and the situation of Africa. The second section deals with the lack of a unitary African approach towards climate change. Regionalisation as a response to the marginalisation of Africa receives attention in the third section of the article. I address the deliberations of the AU pursuant to a common position on climate change, and this is followed by a critical evaluation of the common position. The last section presents a brief reflection on the Copenhagen accord. I conclude with a few general remarks.

2.  The climate change regime

The United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 (UNFCCC) acknowledges the particular situation of African states and the importance of adaptation for the continent. [16]  Article 4(4) of the UNFCCC states:

In accordance with the common but differentiated responsibility principle, [17]  African states did not incur any emission reduction targets in terms of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. [18]  The climate change regime provides for various differential treatment provisions, which acknowledge the situation of developing states. [19]  All states, including those in Africa, [20]  have certain general obligations [21]  in terms of the climate change regime, such as the establishment of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions as well as reporting obligations. [22]  These states also have to formulate and implement national programmes to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions and adaptation measures. [23]  African states also are required to ‘take climate change considerations into account’ in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions. [24]

The climate change regime is not static. The first commitment period in terms of the Kyoto Protocol is restricted to 2012. [25]  In November 2005, the 11th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 11) convened to consider the post-2012 period. [26]  It is important that African states ensure that their needs concerning adaptive capacity receive attention during the post-2012 period. It should be borne in mind that industrialised states have in general proved to be reluctant to play a leading role in terms of the climate change regime. [27]  It is crucial for African states to articulate their needs in order to strengthen their adaptive capacity through negotiations. 

3.  The lack of an African position

African states have previously failed to articulate an African position during the UNFCCC negotiations. [28]  Mumma is of the opinion that this does not mean that Africa has not taken a stand on certain issues. [29]  The problem is that Africa’s stand is one of solidarity with the position of G77 states. The grouping together of African states with G77 states means that extremely under-industrialised African states are lumped together with industrialising states, such as India and China that emit a lion’s share of global greenhouse gases. A possible reason for the grouping is the belief of smaller states that they do not have the power to negotiate with developed states and that it is therefore advantageous to co-operate with China and India. [30]  The problem is, however, that the grouping results in the failure of African states to articulate the distinct interests of the continent. [31]  Gray and Gupta also discuss Africa’s climate change negotiating history and distinguish two periods: the pre-1996 and post-1996 periods. [32]  During the pre-1996 period, Africa was ‘more or less swept into the negotiating process’, whereas the post-1996 period was characterised by an increasing awareness and preparatory work prior to the COP-meeting. [33]  In general, however, African government participation has had little impact on the outcome of the negotiations and constituted a ‘muted voice’ during negotiations. [34]  Africa lacks the necessary expertise to develop and articulate a common position at negotiations and it is therefore of particular importance that the capacity of African negotiators be increased. [35]

Furthermore, existing issues and interests on the continent have impeded the establishment of a common position on climate change. [36]  Oil-producing states fear a shrinking of oil exports, while sub-Saharan states experience desertification because of climate change. Coastal states are concerned about the shrinking of coastlines and diminishing fish stocks. However, issues that serve as common ground for a united front are the vulnerability of African states, their lack of responsibility for the problem and their lack of resources to address it. It is important to use the latter shared concerns as a basis for co-operative measures regarding climate change. [37]

4.  Regional efforts towards a common position concerning a common concern

Individual African states [39] are unable to enhance their adaptive capacity through international negotiations. It is therefore important that African states co-operate in order to increase their collective bargaining power during international climate change negotiations. Further, capacity building concerning a common vision is crucial in order to advance an articulate African position. [40] Regional integration [41] can facilitate the strengthening of its bargaining power, which may offer greater voting power to African states. [42]  It should be borne in mind that Africa is the largest negotiating bloc [43] as it represents more than 25 per cent of the parties to the UNFCCC. [44] Regional integration may also serve as a vehicle for consensus building concerning common objectives. A common objective in this particular instance will be the threat to the African continent posed by climate change. This imminent threat is a catalyst which sparks a common position on climate change and must spawn the required regional legal framework to address the problem. Regional arrangement measures may provide a framework for co-operation on shared resources (in this particular instance the atmosphere) and shared problems (such as the threat of climate change). [45]  Regional co-operation may also facilitate the pooling of resources pursuant to an enhancement of capacity and expertise on a common position.

African leaders view regional integration as a response to the challenges of globalisation and the marginalisation of the African continent. [46] African states previously experimented with the idea of pan-African regional co-operation pursuant to common interests. [47]  Heads of State established the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 in Addis Ababa. The eradication of colonialism was one of the most important purposes of the OAU. [48]  Different opinions existed on the level of economic integration and political unity that states had to pursue. The OAU applied a policy of non-intervention and as such did not succeed in its efforts to influence the policies of its members. [49]  In effect, the OAU was a ‘toothless talk shop’. With the end of the Cold War and the fall of apartheid, the opportunity presented itself to reform the OAU. [50]

The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government convened on 8 and 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya, to establish the AU. [51]  The Constitutive Act of the AU was signed on 11 July 2000 in Lomé, Togo, and entered into force on 26 May 2001. The AU was officially inaugurated on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa.

The AU emerged in the context of globalisation and was established to confront the various challenges [52]  faced by the continent. [53]  The objectives of the AU are inter alia to accelerate political and socio-economic integration; [54]  to promote peace and security; [55] democratic principles and good governance; [56]  human and peoples’ rights; [57]  sustainable development [58]  and ‘co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples’. [59]

The AU is the appropriate regional organisation to facilitate the development of a common African position on climate change. [60] This is in line with the objectives of the AU amongst others to promote and defend African common positions; [61]  establish the required conditions to enable the African continent to take its rightful place in international negotiations; [62]  to encourage international co-operation; [63] and to promote sustainable development. [64]  It is accordingly necessary to reflect briefly on the development of the African common position and to analyse this position.

The Action Plan of the Environment Initiative of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) affirms the concerns of Africa regarding climate change, since it is one of eight priority programmes. [65]  Further, the AU Assembly made important decisions that sparked the development of a common position on climate change. The 8th ordinary session instructed members and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to integrate climate change in their respective development programmes. [66]  The 12th session of the Assembly in 2009 approved the Algiers Declaration on Climate Change, which is to serve as the platform for the common position of African states during the COP negotiations. [67] Furthermore, the Assembly emphasised that global carbon trading mechanisms emerging from the COP 15 negotiations should give African states the opportunity to demand compensation for damage caused to the economies of these states by climate change. [68]  The Assembly approved the decision that a single delegation should represent African states. [69]  The Assembly mandated the AU Commission to work out ways in which such representation could be achieved. The Commission accordingly submitted its recommendations to the Assembly. [70]  The 13th ordinary session in Sirte, Libya, inter alia established the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). [71]  CAHOSCC is to spearhead Africa’s negotiations on climate change. The Assembly authorised the accession of the AU to the UNFCCC and Kyoto. [72]  Furthermore, the Summit urged CAHOSCC, AU ambassadors and African negotiators to make use of the approved African common position on climate change.

The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) [73]  has played an important role in the African response to climate change. The work of AMCEN is primarily based on Decision Two on Climate Change, made at its 12th session in Johannesburg. This consists of two parts: Africa’s preparations for the development of a common position on climate change and a comprehensive framework of African climate change programmes. [74]  The first part is concerned with the involvement of negotiators from African states in regional consultative meetings [75]  that must lead to the development of a common position on climate change as well as capacity building of negotiators. The second part of the deliberations of AMCEN involves sub-regional meetings of experts and negotiators aimed at a better understanding of the issues concerned with the negotiations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and the preparation of the framework of African Climate Change programmes. [76]

It is in particular the third special session of the AMCEN held in Nairobi on 29 May 2009 that marked a decisive event in the response of Africa to the threats of global climate change. [77]  This meeting was significant since it was the first meeting of the African Group of Negotiators with AMCEN and the first meeting of the African High Level Expert Panel on Climate Change. The Ministers adopted the Nairobi Declaration on the African Process for Combating Climate Change, [78]  which serves as a unified expression of the African continent’s resolve to be part of the solution to the climate change challenge. The Declaration emphasises the major challenges and opportunities that the African negotiators face. The Declaration highlights the priorities for Africa, which include adaptation, capacity building, financing and technology development and transfer and it urges the international community to base increased support for the continent on these priorities. [79] The document affirms the importance of the adopted common position on climate change [80] and the need to establish a ‘comprehensive framework of African climate change programmes’. [81] AMCEN accordingly reaffirmed the Conceptual Framework of African Climate Change Programmes. [82] It is further interesting to note that the Declaration emphasises the resolve of AMCEN to integrate adaptation measures into national and regional development plans, policies and strategies, where appropriate, in order to ensure adaptation to climate change in such areas as the environment and energy security. [83]

The Nairobi meeting also resulted in the updated Algiers Declaration, [84]  which served as a reference document for the African negotiators at the AWG-KP9 [85]  and the AWG-LCA 6 [86]  held in Bonn from 1 to 12 June 2009.

5.  Common African position on climate change

This document is based on the pillars of the Bali Action Plan, [87] namely, adaptation, mitigation, financing and technology transfer. It embodies the shared vision [88] of Africa concerning climate change, which emphasises that a climate regime must be ‘inclusive, fair and effective’ and that it should recognise that a solution to the problem will only be possible if it is undertaken in the context of ‘developing states’ need for development space’. [89]

Paragraph 2 addresses the issue of adaptation, the vulnerability of the continent and the need for international co-operation in this regard. The common position calls for the establishment of an Adaptation Action Programme that must be country-driven. This Programme must provide ‘scaled-up new, additional, adequate, predictable and sustainable financial, technological and capacity building support’ to address the key areas of the programme. The target for financial adaptation support to developing states should be at least $67 billion per annum by 2020. Adaptation as such is not a controversial issue since consensus exists that it should be a priority in the post-2012 regime. [90]  The World Bank estimates that the cost of adaptation will be $75 to $100 billion per annum for the period 2010-2050. [91]  The problem is the financing [92]  of adaptation in developing states by developed states. Several complex questions arise concerning the sources of funding and the mechanisms thereof. It is most probable that the issue of adaptation may be stalled by the lack of agreement on financial contributions. This may further deepen the divide between developing and developed states. The Adaptation Fund [93]  serves as an example. It is estimated that the Fund will have approximately $500 million available until 2012. [94]  Furthermore, the current financial economic crisis may have a negative impact on the financial capacity of developed states to provide further funding for adaptation.

In relation to mitigation, the document proposes the maintenance of a ‘firewall’ between mitigation actions by developed states and developing states. [95] Subsequent paragraphs clarify this point of departure. Paragraph 1(b)(i) of the Bali Action Plan refers to ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions’. The reference to ‘action’ may be an indication that options other than commitments, such as targets, may be appropriate. This viewpoint finds support because of the import of the term ‘including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives’. The African position does not allow for this option. It clearly states that developed states have mitigation commitments and developing states mitigation actions. Thus, only developed states should incur quantified emission reduction commitments (QERCs). [96]  Annex I Parties must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and at least 80 per cent to 95 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050. [97]  In this regard, the aggregate number is for all developed states, irrespective of whether they have ratified the Kyoto Protocol or not. The ambitious targets may prove to be unacceptable for Annex I states. [98]  Most Annex I states did not comply with the previous targets. Furthermore, future projections are pessimistic since an increase in emissions is expected. [99]  The position of developed states such as the USA may also impede international consensus. [100]  The African group refuses to differentiate between advanced developing states and developing states. [101]  However, the US has been insistent on a classification between developed, more advanced developing states and developing states. It is the position of the USA that advanced the need for developing states to adopt national mitigation strategies based on a deviation from business-as-usual emissions. In accordance with the African proposal, ‘the aggregate number is for all developed states, regardless of whether they have ratified the Kyoto Protocol or not’. A refusal of developed states to agree to post-2012 commitments based on a disagreement concerning this classification may therefore further encumber other developed states with unrealistic commitments if one adheres to the African position.

In accordance with the viewpoint of the African group, developing states will not be encumbered with QERCs. The common position states that developing states ‘choose from a toolbox of voluntarily registered, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA)’, [102]  ‘including sustainable development policies and measures (SD-PAMS), [103]  programmatic CDM and others’. [104]  The mitigation actions of developing states are conditional on the provision of technology, financing and capacity building in a ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ manner. [105]  The African group accordingly sets a target of financial flows at $200 billion by 2020. [106]  Developed parties will have to report their progress through national communications.

It is interesting to compare the African position with the prescription of the actions required by developing states in the Bali Action Plan. Paragraph 1(b)(ii) refers to ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner’. The language in the Bali Action Plan is dubious. Does the MRV clause apply to the actions of developing states only, to the support of developed states or to both? The African position clarifies this since paragraph 3.3 explicitly states that MRV applies to mitigation actions and support.

The insistence on a ‘firewall’ between mitigation commitments of developed states and actions of developing states must also be understood in the context of the need of developing states for development space. However, development does not have to be unsustainable and an investment in environmentally-friendly technology may have various advantages. [107]  It is in this regard important to recall that adaptation is the first priority for African states pursuant to their own survival. These states are not responsible for the consequences of climate change and developed states need to assist them in order to adapt to climate change. The African position makes provision for mitigation in order to cater for the industrialisation of African states. This is important for the promotion of continental sustainable development. Adaptation, however, is the primary priority pursuant to environmental security.

The African Group furthermore supports the creation of an enhanced financial mechanism as proposed by the G77 and China. [108]  The source of funding will be developed states through the realisation of their commitment under article 4.3 of the UNFCCC. Funding will be ‘new and additional’ and over and above overseas development assistance. Furthermore, funding pledged outside of the Convention shall not be regarded as a fulfilment of article 4.3 obligations. In general, the financial expectations of Africa may be incompatible with the financial capability of industrialised states.

In relation to forestry, the common position is in favour of a REDD-Plus mechanism [109]  that should accommodate ‘different national circumstances and respective capabilities’. Funds should be ‘adequate, predictable and sustainable’ from a variety of sources, which include global carbon markets. [110]  This position allows for support from public and private resources. [111]

6.  Critical thoughts on a common African position [112]

The discussed common position of Africa raises a few general issues of importance in the context of the current discussion.

First, it is important to bear in mind that the African group is not homogeneous. [113]  The African group consists of oil-producing states, coastal states, island states and agricultural states that have unique interests concerning climate change. These states have different interests, which may hinder the development of a ‘common interest’ [114]  among African states. It is therefore difficult to establish a truly unitary position that could present the interests of all of the states on the continent. States may accordingly betray the common position in order to realise their own interests at negotiations. [115]  Unfortunately, member states of the AU exhibit a lack of commitment to real integration. These states still cling to nationalism and pursue shortsighted self-interest. It is therefore important that African states do not merely pay lip service to the common position. Further, African states have different levels of development. South Africa serves as an example of an advanced developing country that contributes to climate change and that may have to contribute more actively to the global solution through mitigation actions. Emissions from other states are miniscule. It is possible for more powerful states, such as South Africa, to ensure that an African position is not contrary to its national interests. This results in a situation where African states (with negligible emissions) are grouped with South Africa. The situation that arises is ironic. A lack of capacity among African states necessitates a pooling of resources pursuant to a common position on climate change. This lack of capacity, however, also creates the opportunity for more powerful states to dominate the outcome of the co-operation. This means that the voices of less powerful states may be drowned through the capacity of the powerful in a regional grouping. The refusal to distinguish between advanced developing and other developing states may be to the benefit of South Africa, but from a pragmatic point of view is not of relevance to most African states. It may be based on an ideological consideration of historic responsibility that, however, does not promote the interests of African states if one considers that African states are the victims of greenhouse gasses, irrespective of whether it stems from developed or advanced developing states.

A practical illustration of the effect of the asymmetry between African states is evident in the instance of technology transfer. Clearly, South Africa does not have the same needs concerning technology transfer as Lesotho. However, the presence of South Africa can also have positive advantages since it may enhance the capacity of the African negotiators. It is therefore important to optimise the positive influence of South Africa. South Africa must assume a leading role pursuant to the interests of the African continent. Thus, African states should indeed aim to act and speak with one voice based on solidarity [116]  and acknowledge that the continent faces a threat which requires collective measures. [117] 

Second, the existence of a common position on climate change does not mean that Africa has won the battle. Negotiators should put forward the common position of Africa in such a manner that it influences negotiations pursuant to an agreement beneficial to the African continent. This raises a few important issues. The relationship between the African group and CAHOSCC is not clear. CAHOSCC is supposed to spearhead the negotiations. It is important to ensure that this group possesses the necessary capacity in order to pursue the interests of Africa during climate change negotiations. Thus, this group should ultimately serve as a regional negotiating force of African expertise concerning climate change. In this manner, regionalism will cater for environmental security. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the common position co-ordinates the interests of member states of the AU. This means that political goodwill concerning climate change as reflected by the common position needs to be translated into concrete actions at the upcoming negotiations and beyond. The AU must be a force to be reckoned with.

Third, the second important phase concerning the deliberations of AMCEN requires action. This refers to the implementation of the African framework for climate change programmes. RECs, [118]  such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), [119]  will have to play an important role in relation to the implementation of these programmes at sub-regional level. The African continent in the past has lacked the capacity [120]  for a co-ordinated implementation of environmental measures and it is important to address this issue in order to ensure that action speaks louder than words. [121]

Fourth, multi-stakeholder involvement concerning the response of the AU to climate change is vital to ensure that the needs of interested parties are taken into account. The enhancement of the capacity of regional NGOs, [122]  community organisations and research groups will ensure a constructive contribution to the implementation of frameworks in Africa. [123]

Fifth, it is interesting to note that the common position does not make any explicit mention of the important relationship between climate change and human rights in the AU context. The impact of climate change on human rights has been explicitly recognised by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) in its Resolution on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impacts in Africa. [124]  The AU Resolution ‘calls on the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to take all necessary measures to ensure that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is included in the African Union’s negotiating team on climate change’. It must be borne in mind that article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) provides for the right of peoples to a ‘general satisfactory environment favourable to their development’. Article 16(1) stipulates that ‘every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health’. In the SERAC case the African Commission held, inter alia, that article 24 of the African Charter imposes an obligation on the state to take reasonable measures ‘to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources’. [125]  It is therefore possible to argue that member states of the AU have an obligation to take specific action in order to address climate change pursuant to human rights protection. Constructive participation at international climate change negotiations based on a common position aimed at the enhancement of adaptive capacity, mitigation and the transfer of technology and financial resources may constitute a reasonable measure to secure sustainable development. Thus, the common position on climate change may have the potential to contribute to the promotion of human rights in Africa.

Sixth, the marginalisation of the continent in the global economic and political decision-making system means that Africa in general finds it difficult to make its voice heard. [126]  It is therefore possible to learn from the way in which the common position concerning climate change has been developed and carried forth.

Seventh, the common position provides the African continent with an opportunity to contribute to an agreement [127]  on post-2012 measures to address climate change that is fair and equitable. In this manner it may ensure that the AU contributes constructively to the future development and implementation of international environmental law.

7.  Copenhagen Conference [128]

The Copenhagen Conference (COP 15) [129] constituted a deadline to resolve questions concerning the post-2012 climate regime. [130] The Conference, however, could not meet expectations. Instead, it resulted in the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009, which reflects a political agreement. Ethiopia (on behalf of the African group) and South Africa were among the states that reached an agreement on the accord. [131]  The accord therefore does not represent a detailed legal Protocol pertaining to the post-2012 period. [132]  The Copenhagen Accord rather serves as the basis for further international negotiations. In this sense, it represents a point of departure rather than a final product. [133]  This implies that the African common position will continue to fulfil an important role during upcoming negotiations at COP 16 [134]  and COP 17 [135]  pursuant to the enhancement of the adaptive capacity of African states.

It is interesting to reflect on the actions of the African group during COP 15. African states boycotted negotiations on 14 December in order to compel developed nations to adopt a second round of commitments. [136]  This was done in protest against the perceived efforts of the developed states to kill Kyoto. African nations’ call threw the negotiations in disarray. Africa is in favour of an agreement with emission reduction targets in order to avoid the catastrophe of climate change. The real impact of this display of power is questionable, but it indicates a more active and co-ordinated negotiating partnership that pursues the interests of the continent in a forceful manner.

However, the African consensus was disrupted after Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who is the co-ordinator of CAHOSCC, unilaterally departed from the common position and submitted the Joint Appeal of France and Ethiopia, Representing Africa, for an Ambitious Copenhagen Accord. [137]  Sudan’s chief negotiator and Chairperson of the G77, Lumumba Di-Aping, accused Zenawi of capitulating under pressure from rich states. The actions of Zenawi and the response thereto accordingly led to the demise of the common negotiating strategy of the African group. [138]

The current discussion also warrants a brief reflection on the Accord. The Accord reiterates the particular vulnerability of Africa and that developed states shall support the implementation of adaptation action in developing states through ‘adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity building’. [139]  Developed states have committed themselves to new and additional funding ‘approaching $30 billion for the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation’. [140]  Africa will have priority access to adaptation funding. Furthermore, by 2020, developed states commit to a goal of $100 billion, but this is linked to ‘meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation’. The Accord establishes the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, which shall operate as an entity of the financial mechanism. [141]  The commitment of the developed world seems to be a far cry from the support envisaged in the common position, which refers to $67 billion per annum for adaptation and $200 billion in support of mitigation by 2020. The MRV clause applies in relation to financial support. The Accord does refer to the establishment of a High Level Panel under the COP ‘to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue’. [142]  It is not clear what the exact powers of this Panel will be.

It is too early to determine whether the calls for ambitious QER targets, as reflected in the common position, will be agreed upon. The Accord specifies that industrialised states will commit to implement (individually or jointly) quantified economy-wide emission targets for 2020, to be submitted to the secretariat by 31 January 2010. [143]  The MRV clause will also apply in this regard. This means that Annex I states may define their own target level and base year.

Developing states will implement mitigation actions. [144]  The Accord therefore underwrites the distinction between the commitments of industrialised states and the national actions of developing states. Mitigation actions will be submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat. Mitigation actions that do not receive financial support will be subject to domestic MRV and states will report through national communications with provisions for ‘international consultation’. The Accord makes provision for a registry for the listing of NAMAs that will receive support. Supported NAMAs will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the COP. This approach is in line with the distinction that the African position makes between supported NAMAs and other actions.

The Accord also establishes a technology mechanism as called for in the common position. [145]  The Accord calls for the immediate establishment of a mechanism in order to mobilise funds for REDD-plus from developed states. [146] However, it does not resolve the issue of private versus public sources.

In general, it seems that not all of the concerns of Africa as embodied in the common position have been met since no agreement has been reached on the emission targets of industrialised states. Furthermore, financial contributions clearly fall short from that required by developing states. The AU Assembly, however, recently endorsed the Accord and urged members to make individual submissions to the UNFCCC Secretariat. [147]

8.  Concluding remarks

Regional integration, through the AU, has the potential to facilitate co-operation pursuant to the articulation of African interests at international environmental negotiations. The aforementioned discussion of the common position on climate change indicates that regional integration can pursue much-needed adaptation through international negotiations and in this sense even promote environmental security since an enhanced adaptive capacity could curb conflicts concerning scarce resources in the context of the threats that climate change pose. However, recent practice pertaining to the common position and the actions of the African group during COP 15 indicate that the continent needs more than a ‘common position on paper’ in order to realise adaptive capacity through international climate change negotiations. The establishment of a common position and experiences during COP 15 provide valuable lessons and insights for future climate change negotiations. It is important that the African group learns from mistakes made during COP 15. It is unacceptable that the Ethiopian President decided to depart from the agreed position. It is even stranger that the AU Assembly subsequently endorsed his position for upcoming negotiations. Thus, heterogeneity of the group may continue to haunt these states. It is therefore important that African states aspire to the objectives and principles of the AU in order to overcome this obstacle. African states must stay committed to the agreed position and act together forcefully in order to further adaptive capacity. How will African states be able to develop and implement a comprehensive framework of African climate change programmes if they are unable to carry forth a common position?

The narrative concerning the actions of African states, however, also contains positive features. The grouping of African states based on shared vulnerability places the continent in a more powerful position which may counter marginalisation. The walk-out of African states during COP 15 supports this viewpoint. Pan-Africanism, [148]  which is after all the underlying rationale for regional integration on the African continent, may therefore set the stage to address the threat of climate change. However, the outcome of further negotiations in 2010 and 2011 will indicate whether the fruits of pan-Africanism can amplify the voice of a marginalised continent for the well-being of its people.