The ramifications of communication surveillance laws on human rights pertinent to elections in Zimbabwe

 Paul Mudau
 LLB (Limpopo) LLM (Pretoria) LLM (Western Cape) PhD (Witwatersrand)
 Senior Lecturer, Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law, College of Law, University of South Africa
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8696-7495
 This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

 Edition: AHRLJ Volume 25 No 2 2025
 Pages: 801 - 821
 Citation: P Mudau ‘The ramifications of communication surveillance laws on human rights pertinent to elections in Zimbabwe’ (2025) 25 African Human Rights Law Journal 801-821
 http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2025/v25n2a14
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Summary

This article critically examines the ramifications of the stringent enforcement of restrictive and prohibitive communication surveillance laws and practices, which unjustifiably traduce fundamental human rights and freedoms pertinent to Zimbabwean elections. Based on doctrinal legal research, this article examines how state surveillance, facilitated by laws permitting the monitoring of digital communications, impacts fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the right to privacy. Evidence from Zimbabwe reveals a chilling effect on political participation, where fear of surveillance leads to self-censorship, reduced civic engagement and the erosion of trust among civil society actors. The deployment of spyware and mass surveillance tools, often lacking judicial oversight, has disproportionately targeted human rights defenders, journalists and opposition figures, undermining democratic accountability and electoral integrity. The article argues that the current surveillance regime in Zimbabwe not only contravenes human rights standards but also significantly impairs free and fair elections. It concludes with recommendations for legal reforms, institutional safeguards and advocacy strategies aimed at aligning surveillance laws and practices with democratic principles and human rights obligations.

Key words: communication surveillance; democracy; digital rights; elections; human rights; political participation; Zimbabwe

1 Introduction

Zimbabwe’s political landscape has long been characterised by authoritarian tendencies, with the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party maintaining a tight grip on state institutions.1 In recent years, this control has extended into the digital realm through the enactment, amendment, and enforcement of various communication surveillance laws.2 These laws, particularly the Interception of Communications Act (ICA) of 2007,3 have raised serious concerns about the erosion of democratic principles and the infringement of constitutionally protected human rights.4 As elections remain a cornerstone of democratic participation, the intersection of surveillance and electoral processes in Zimbabwe demands urgent scrutiny.

The ICA grants sweeping powers to government ministers to authorise surveillance without judicial oversight,5 undermining the separation of powers and violating international, regional and domestic human rights standards. Despite Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution6 explicitly recognising the right to privacy under section 57, the ICA remains misaligned with these protections. The lack of procedural safeguards, transparency, and accountability mechanisms has enabled unchecked surveillance practices that threaten the freedoms of expression, association, and political participation – rights that are essential during electoral periods.7

Surveillance laws in Zimbabwe have disproportionately affected journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders,8 groups that play a pivotal role in safeguarding electoral integrity and democratic accountability. These laws do not protect journalistic privilege and lawyer-client confidentiality, exposing these actors to dragnet surveillance and intimidation.9 This legal vulnerability has had a chilling effect on investigative journalism and legal advocacy, both of which are crucial in exposing electoral malpractice and defending civil liberties. The ramifications of communication surveillance laws extend beyond individual rights to the broader integrity of Zimbabwe’s electoral processes.10 Surveillance fosters an environment of fear and self-censorship, discouraging political dissent and civic engagement. In a context where opposition parties and civil society are already marginalised, surveillance further skews the playing field, undermining the credibility of elections.

Using a doctrinal legal research, the article critically examines the ramifications of Zimbabwe’s stringent enforcement of restrictive and prohibitive communication surveillance laws and practices that unjustifiably breach fundamental human rights during elections. It unfolds in four parts, of which the first is the introduction. The second part unpacks the international and regional legal frameworks for digital and political rights. Third, it presents a case study of communication surveillance laws and practices during the Zimbabwean elections. The fourth part is the conclusion and recommendations.

2 International and regional legal frameworks for digital and political rights

2.1 International legal framework

During elections, respect for relevant human rights norms and standards is pivotal for the delivery of free and genuine elections. A wide range of fundamental human rights and freedoms requires full consideration and realisation, including free speech, opinion, information, assembly, association, movement, non-discrimination, privacy, the right to security of a person, and the right to political participation. These basic entitlements bear a particular significance in electoral processes,11 and are central to the advancement of genuine electoral democracy.12

Digital expressions and internet freedoms are under immense threat. Internet and telecommunications shutdowns have emerged as a popular means of information control.13 The intentional prevention or disruption of access to or dissemination of information online violates human rights law.14 Thus, an appropriate response must be premised on the international human rights foundation. In 2013, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council adopted the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance,15 which stresses that laws and regulations related to communications surveillance must comply with international human rights standards and adequately protect human rights. Consistent with the above, regional and national legal frameworks need to respect, promote, protect and fulfil all the fundamental digital and political rights and freedoms that are necessary for a thriving multi-party democratic system of government. Furthermore, the Draft Legal Instrument on Government-Led Surveillance and Privacy will provide guidance on government-organised surveillance in the context of law enforcement and intelligence gathering and processing in the digital age.16

Fair media access for all political candidates and parties, including for campaigning and advertising purposes, is also important. ‘Media regulations should provide for safeguards against political censorship, unfair government advantage, and unequal/inequitable access during the campaign period.’17 Accordingly, the right of access to information, as well as the right to express and disseminate information, is a ‘foundational requirement of the practice of democratic governance’.18 Internationally, the right to information and freedom of expression is entrenched by article 19(2) of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)19 and article 21 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).20 CRPD specifically obliges state parties to urge private entities,21 and to encourage the mass media22 to utilise the internet to provide information and services to the public, including persons with disabilities. According to article 17 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),23 state parties must recognise ‘the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that the child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources’.

For voters to freely formulate and express their will, citizens must have access to information about candidates and political parties as well as their proposed programmes, and the democratic electoral processes. Civic and voter education, which is often credited with imparting citizens with the skills to constructively participate in democratic electoral processes, resonates with the right to access information.24 Obviously, an informed choice essentially encompasses the elements of the right to seek and receive information, to establish a ‘free’ choice.

General Comment 34 of the Human Rights Committee recognises that freedom of expression includes ‘all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and internet-based modes of expression’.25 The implications of these provisions for digital authoritarianism require governments to permit citizens to enjoy the rights to information and freedom of expression. ICCPR also recognises the right to peaceful assembly,26 the right to freedom of association27 and the right to political participation.28 The protection of the right to privacy and data protection is about securing people’s confidence and security online, as well as facilitating the free flow of information and ideas. International human rights instruments further recognised the right to privacy,29 allowing an individual ‘to hide or obscure elements of their life from the wider public’.30 The personal data of citizens who are eligible to vote has become more susceptible to mass surveillance and digital interception.31

Finally, Principle 1(d) of the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Free Expression and Access to Information states:32

No restriction on freedom of expression or information on the ground of national security may be imposed unless the government can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate national security interest. The burden of demonstrating the validity of the restriction rests with the government.

The restriction may be prescribed by law. However, cognisant of the stringent enforcement of restrictive and prohibitive communication surveillance laws and practices, which renege on digital and political rights, the law itself must be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on the values of human dignity, equality, and freedom.

2.2 African regional human rights system

The right of access to information is necessary for the realisation of the right to participate in government directly or through freely chosen representatives, as guaranteed by article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).33 Article 9 guarantees women’s rights to participate in the political and decision-making processes.34 Popular participation is also endorsed by article 3(g) of the African Union Constitutive Act.35 The Guidelines on Access to Information and Elections in Africa (Guidelines)36 state that it is impossible for citizens to meaningfully exercise their right to vote in the manner envisaged by article 13 of the African Charter without access to accurate, credible and reliable information about a broad range of issues prior to, during, and after elections. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Democracy Charter)37 recognises the effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes,38 and popular participation through universal suffrage as the inalienable right of the people.39 The African Charter also ensconces other key rights, such as freedom of association40 and freedom of assembly.41 The enjoyment of these rights and freedoms is protected from any kind of infringement based, among other factors, on political or any other opinion.42

Crucially, the right to information as well as the right to express and disseminate information are provided by article 9 of the African Charter and Principle 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa.43 Principle 31(1) of the latter provides that ‘access to information shall be granted as expeditiously and inexpensively as possible, and in accessible formats and technologies’. The African Charter does not expressly recognise the right to privacy. However, this right is inferred from other fundamental rights that are expressly guaranteed in the Charter.44 Principle 41(3) of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa deals with privacy and communication surveillance. The proviso provides as follows:

States shall ensure that any law authorising targeted communication surveillance provides adequate safeguards for the right to privacy, including:

1. the prior authorisation of an independent and impartial judicial authority;
2. due process safeguards;
3. specific limitation on the time, manner, place and scope of the surveillance;
4. notification of the decision authorising surveillance within a reasonable time of the conclusion of such surveillance;
5. proactive transparency on the nature and scope of its use; and
6. effective monitoring and regular review by an independent oversight mechanism.

In article 7, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter)45 guarantees that ‘every child who is capable of communicating [their] own views shall be assured the right to express [their] opinions freely in all matters and to disseminate [their] opinions’. Further, the African Children’s Charter provides for the right to freedom of association.46 The African Youth Charter47 also confers on every young person the rights to freedom of expression,48 freedom of association49 and youth participation.50 Article 11(2)(e) requires state parties to ‘provide access to information such that young people become aware of their rights and of opportunities to participate in decision making and civic life’.51

In 2023, the Principles and Guidelines for the Use of Digital and Social Media in Elections in Africa were adopted by the Association of African Electoral Authorities (AAEA). Commendably, these Principles and Guidelines constitute the most comprehensive rights-based framework for digital and social media in elections in Africa. The Principles and Guidelines provide that ‘[a]ll fundamental rights can be directly and indirectly enhanced by access to the internet, including access to the digital and social media’.52 The enshrined rights include free, fair, and credible elections; freedom of opinion and expression; access to information; freedom of association and assembly; and the right to privacy. In this framework, the limitation of freedom of expression and access to information through internet disruptions instigated by either state or non-state actors is flagged as being inconsistent with international standards of legality, proportionality and legitimacy.53

Additionally, in 2023, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) adopted the Resolution on the Deployment of Mass and Unlawful Targeted Communication Surveillance and its Impact on Human Rights in Africa.54 The Resolution calls on states to ensure surveillance is necessary, proportionate and authorised by law; align surveillance laws with international human rights standards; require judicial authorisation and independent oversight for surveillance activities; promote privacy-enhancing technologies and avoid weakening encryption; and provide effective remedies for victims of unlawful surveillance and prosecute violations.

3 Communication surveillance laws and elections in Zimbabwe

3.1 Constitutional framework for fundamental rights and freedoms

Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution in 2013. The Constitution has been lauded for containing provisions that entrench elements of fundamental rights and freedoms, constitutionalism, and the rule of law.55 Regarding international agreements, Zimbabwe is a dualist state, meaning that a treaty can only bind the Republic after it has been incorporated into law/national legislation.56 This is because, in a dualist regime, international law and domestic law are treated as separate legal systems.57 Hence, section 34 of the Constitution states that ‘[t]he state must ensure that all international conventions, treaties and agreements to which Zimbabwe is a party are incorporated into domestic law’. International human rights treaties that were ratified before the 1993 amendment to the Constitution form part of domestic law.58

Section 3(c) of the Constitution stipulates that Zimbabwe is founded on values and principles of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Chapter four of the Constitution is the Declaration of Rights. The state, including every institution and government agency at every level, must respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights and freedoms.59 The right to freedom of opinion and expression is a ‘central pillar of democratic societies, and a guarantor of free and fair electoral processes, and meaningful and representative public and political discourse’.60 Section 61 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the media.61 This right includes the freedom to seek, receive and communicate ideas and other information.62 In principle, media coverage should afford all political parties equal time for broadcasting their political advertisements.63 In terms of sections 61(4)(b) to (c) of the Constitution, all state-owned media of communication must be impartial and afford fair opportunity for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions.

Nevertheless, the right to freedom of expression could be limited due to incitement of violence, advocacy of hate speech, malicious injury to a person’s reputation and the breach of a person’s right to privacy.64 In the course of exercising freedom of expression, ‘some views may deliberately or inadvertently misinform, mislead, discredit, defame or cause distress to individuals or groups’.65 Accordingly, there is a need to balance the entitlements of digital rights with the potential harm that may arise from exercising such rights.66

Furthermore, the right to access information is conferred by section 62 of the Constitution, insofar as the information is required for the exercise or protection of a right.67 The essential civic and voter education that citizens must be informed about in order to exercise their electoral rights should be conducted and supervised by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC).68 In section 58, the Constitution provides for the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the right to privacy is also entrenched in section 57 of the Constitution. Section 67 of the Constitution, entitled ‘Political rights’, is said to ‘provide for multiple rights with affinity to elections or the electoral process’.69 Political rights, as guaranteed in section 67 of the Constitution, encompass the right to campaign freely and peacefully for a political party or cause,70 to vote71 and to be voted for.72 A meaningful electoral process upholds everyone’s right to equality and non-discrimination, especially to prevent unfair treatment based on political affiliation. Therefore, the right to equality and non-discrimination is enshrined in section 56 of the Constitution.

3.2 Domestic legal landscape and practice for communication surveillance and elections

Evidence demonstrates that surveillance activities in Zimbabwe tend to intensify during times of heightened political engagement.73 The disintegration of civil and political rights and the stifling of democratic space in Zimbabwe have been engineered under the pretext of crafting state security and public order.74 Thus, prompting the legalisation of surveillance and interception of communication laws. The promulgation of the Postal and Telecommunication Act (PTA) of 2001,75 the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002 and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002,76 was supplemented by the Interception of Communications Act of 2007).77 The primary purpose was to solidify the President’s hold on power and drown out opposition.78 POSA was specifically utilised by the late former President Robert Mugabe to consolidate his political power.

POSA has been criticised for suppressing dissent and criminalising ‘the legitimate exercise of freedoms of expression, association and assembly’.79 Indeed, ordinary citizens continue to face a regime that remains intolerant of basic rights, peaceful dissent, and free expression.80 Citizens cannot easily ‘campaign, or demonstrate and petition online, in line with their constitutional rights, without running the risk of being charged with inciting violence’.81

Shortcomings in AIPPA resulted in inadequate protection of the right to privacy as enshrined by section 57 of the Constitution. The introduction of AIPPA aimed to ensure fairer coverage in the electronic media in the month leading up to the election. However, in practice, the Act is often used to close nearly all privately owned media.82 In 2020, AIPPA was repealed by three new pieces of legislation: the Data Protection Act (DPA),83 the Freedom of Information Act (FIA),84 and the Zimbabwe Media Commission Act (ZMCA).85

The object of FIA is to give effect to the rights of freedom of expression, media freedom, and access to information as provided in sections 61 and 62 of the Constitution. However, an in-depth analysis reveals that FIA lacks a clear-cut provision that expressly aims to fulfil the right to information.86 Article 7(1) of FIA merely provides that anyone wishing to access information may make a request. The Cyber and Data Protection Act87 of 2021 has been enacted to fortify the suppression of internet freedoms. Sabao and Nenjerama argue that the Cyber and Data Protection Act’s ‘criminalisation of internet-based protests viewed to be hostile to ZANU PF’s hegemony is a testament to the levels to which ZANU-PF will go to maintain a hold on power’.88

In December 2021, President Emmerson Mnangagwa signed into law DPA, which includes a cyber security regulatory framework.89 DPA amended provisions of three laws: the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform Act),90 the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act,91 and the Interception of Communications Act. Apart from making provisions for data protection, another objective of the DPA is to create and foster a technology-driven business environment, encouraging technological development and the lawful use of technology. According to the DPA, the term ‘sensitive data’ encompasses political opinions92 and membership in a political association.93 The classification of certain information as ‘sensitive data’ may be used to flag content that appears to contradict or challenge the interests of the ruling party. The processing of genetic data, biometric data and health data may be conducted without the written consent of the data subject where, among other reasons, it is necessary to comply with national security laws.94 Nevertheless, DPA has been criticised for crushing dissent and infringing on the digital rights of citizens.95

ICA is regarded as Zimbabwe’s primary communications surveillance law.96 Under this Act, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the police, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and the Zimbabwe Defense Intelligence Agency are given interception powers. These powers are exercised without first requiring judicial oversight. The target for surveillance includes ‘journalists from both the state-owned media and the private media, civic activists, NGO heads, opposition leaders and senior ZANU PF (ruling party) officials’.97

ZMCA was enacted to confer powers on the Zimbabwe Media Commission as dictated by section 249(2) of the Constitution. Subject to section 2 of ZMCA, ‘media’ means various forms of information dissemination, including radio and television broadcasting, and the internet or any other electronic means. Nonetheless, the content of the ZMCA is questionable. First, the Act lacks a provision that prescribes term limits for the commissioners and chairpersons.98 The indefinite duration of serving in the Commission has the potential to establish and ingrain a culture of bias, especially when considering the highly politicised nature of every facet of Zimbabwean society. Second, section 8 of ZMCA empowers the Commission to investigate any allegations of human rights transgressions. The Commission could be used to undermine media rights and target media outlets that expose major wrongdoing by government officials. Third, section 10(1) of ZMCA grants the Commission the discretion to investigate, hear or inquire into the form of public or closed proceedings. Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) argues that

this provision violates the ‘right of access to information in section 62 of the Constitution and also media freedom, particularly the right to seek and receive information as stipulated in section 61 of the Constitution’. Such wide discretion poses a threat to the exercise of rights.99

Section 10(7) of ZMCA confers on the minister the power to order, at any stage during the investigation, hearing or inquiry, that the proceedings should be held in camera or as closed proceedings. The minister may rely on the grounds that the publicity of proceedings would prejudice the defence, external relations, internal security or economic interests of the state. This provision is deemed problematic because ‘defence and internal security are mysterious and unqualified aspects’,100 as anything and everything can be declared a national security issue.

One more alarming fact is that the political system in Zimbabwe is highly militarised.101 The Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) is a ‘privileged political actor and overseer of the entire political system’.102 As a result, the military likewise plays a significant role in the digital surveillance of civilians,103 with ‘military-driven surveillance practices’.104 The commander of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Edzai Zimonyo, once complained that social media ‘poses a dangerous threat to our national security’.105 According to Zimonyo, it is necessary for the military to circumscribe civilian communication on social media.106 Clearly, this constitutes a form of regressive digital surveillance that infringes upon citizens’ digital rights. Amid the violation of human rights owing to surveillance practices, the reliance on judicial recourse is far-fetched due to a highly politicised and partisan judiciary.107 Among state apparatus, key actors in the surveillance of key opposition party members, leaders of civil society organisations, lawyers, journalists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are the Zimbabwe Military Intelligence (ZMI), the Police Internal Investigation Services (PISI) and the CIO.108

The covert political intentions in technologies pretentiously aim to deliver digitally networked cities by utilising artificial intelligence (AI) to boost security in the cities.109 However, such ambitions are viewed as the launching of a mass surveillance system targeting critics and opponents.110 In March 2018, Zimbabwe entered into an agreement with CloudWalk Technology, a Chinese facial recognition company, under which the latter would provide Zimbabwe with a massive surveillance infrastructure to track its citizens through a biometric voter registration.111 Primarily, the objective is to access the database of all registered voters in Zimbabwe by creating an infrastructure for face biometrics in return for access to voters’ digitised faces.112 These face biometrics would simplify the identification of political dissidents. According to Polyakova and Meserole, China has been exporting digital authoritarianism to foreign regimes for decades.113 Gravett labels China’s quest for a ‘cyber superpower’ and its implications on Africa as ‘digital neo-colonialism’.114 China strategically and tactically applies ‘economic and political pressure through technology to control and influence the actions of African nations’.115 Zimbabwe actually depends on ‘an assorted mixture of surveillance technologies from China, Russia and Iran’.116

The integrity, availability and confidentiality of voters’ personal data have always been a huge concern.117 These challenges were reflected in three ways: (i) selective access to voters’ personal data; (ii) integrity of voters’ biometric data; and (iii) data obfuscation and black-boxing.118 The electoral management body, the ZEC,119 established in terms of section 238 of the Constitution, denied opposition parties access to the voters’ roll stored in its servers, citing reasons for protecting the security of sensitive data. This means that, in contravention of section 57 of the Constitution, which protects the privacy of personal data, the ZEC selectively availed the voters’ database to ZANU-PF, which contained information on all registered voters’ names, mobile numbers and constituency details.120

In 2022, the ZEC confirmed that it had established a media-monitoring committee responsible for monitoring the activities of journalists.121 The purpose of the committee, comprising members of the Zimbabwe Media Commission and the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe, is ‘to ensure that the media adheres to its regulations’.122 This move is backed by law, subject to section 160K(1) of the Electoral Act, which states the following:

The Commission, with the assistance, at its request, of the Zimbabwe Media Commission established by section 248 of the Constitution, and the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe established by section 3 of the Broadcasting Services Act [Chapter 12:06] (No 3 of 2001), shall monitor the Zimbabwean news media during any election period to ensure that political parties, candidates, broadcasters, print publishers and journalists observe the provisions of this Part.

Additionally, section 160K(2) of the Electoral Act requires the Zimbabwe Media Commission to produce a post-election report, which includes coverage of the election by the news media. Thus, the media and political players are obligated to adhere to the prescriptions outlined in Statutory Instrument 33 of 2008 (Media Coverage of Elections Regulations 2008).123 Most journalists in Zimbabwe are victims of surveillance and its ramifications.124 Fearful of retaliation, they rarely speak openly about it.

For the sake of retaining political power in the hands of the ruling ZANU-PF, digital authoritarianism extends so far that it even manipulates the voters’ roll. According to Gwagwa, ‘in Zimbabwe, some politically connected parties have already threatened reprisals against people who vote a certain way since they have access to biometric data and voters’ serial numbers to monitor voting patterns’.125 These practices lead to misidentification, fraud and civic exclusion of voters who have been identified as anti-political establishments spearheaded by ZANU-PF.

Reports suggested that the Zimbabwean government has sought technical support from China to enhance its capacity for monitoring digital communications.126 Notably, the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence, also referred to as the National Defence College, was reportedly preparing to host Chinese instructors to train military personnel in various intelligence-related technical disciplines.127 The institution was also expected to be equipped with surveillance technology supplied by Huawei, designed to intercept diplomatic, political, commercial and private communications.

Empirical research reveals that surveillance in Zimbabwe has led to a pronounced chilling effect, where individuals self-censor, avoid political engagement, and refrain from associating with perceived dissidents.128 This fear-driven behaviour undermines the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, which are essential for democratic participation.129 There is growing avoidance of protests, political meetings, and online activism due to the perceived risk of being monitored or targeted. Such deterrence not only silences dissent but also distorts the electoral process by limiting the diversity of voices and ideas.

Surveillance laws and technologies have been weaponised against civil society organisations, journalists and human rights defenders. The use of spyware, coupled with SIM card registration and telecom data mining, has enabled targeted harassment and intimidation.130 These practices compromise the safety and effectiveness of watchdog groups, which play a critical role in monitoring elections and advocating for transparency. The erosion of trust within civil society networks further weakens their ability to mobilise and hold the government accountable.

The ramifications of surveillance extend beyond individual rights to the structural integrity of Zimbabwe’s electoral system.131 Surveillance fosters an environment of fear and suspicion, discouraging voter turnout and political activism.132 Moreover, opposition parties and independent candidates are disproportionately affected, as their communications are more likely to be intercepted or disrupted. This imbalance undermines the principle of fair competition and violates international norms governing free and fair elections. Without reforms, surveillance will continue to serve as a tool for political control rather than a means of public security.

4 Conclusion and recommendations

This article has demonstrated that Zimbabwe’s communication surveillance laws, particularly the Interception of Communications Act, pose significant threats to human rights and democratic processes, especially during elections. The lack of judicial oversight, transparency and accountability mechanisms has enabled the misuse of surveillance powers to suppress dissent, intimidate civil society, and undermine electoral integrity. These practices violate constitutional protections and international human rights standards, creating a climate of fear and eroding public trust in democratic institutions. As a result, the state deliberately established legal frameworks and institutions that explicitly conduct surveillance on several targets, including opposition leaders, journalists, civic activists and NGO heads.

Zimbabwe needs to adhere to the generally accepted standards of surveillance activities. It is recommended that it must comply with international, regional, and domestic human rights instruments, including the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, the African Charter and the African Commission’s resolution on surveillance. Centrally, the country must ensure that its communication surveillance laws, such as the Protection of Privacy Act, the Public Order and Security Act, the Interception of Communications Act, the Data Protection Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Cyber and Data Protection Act, the Broadcasting Services Act and the Zimbabwe Media Commission Act, which are clearly anti-digital and political rights, are aligned with the promotion and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Journalists and the media at large also bear responsibility for disseminating information by educating the public on the nature and impact of communications laws and practices governing surveillance in both electoral processes and everyday life. There is a need to balance the quest for maintaining state security and citizens’ rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and information dissemination.

Specifically, ICA requires urgent and comprehensive reform. The Act currently permits broad and unchecked surveillance powers, including the collection of dragnet data, without judicial oversight. This undermines constitutional rights to privacy and freedom of expression, especially during elections. It is recommended that the ICA be redrafted to include judicial authorisation for surveillance warrants, clear limitations on scope, and explicit protections for journalists, lawyers, and civil society actors. These reforms should align with global best practices and Zimbabwe’s constitutional obligations.

Effective oversight is essential to prevent the abuse of surveillance powers. Zimbabwe should establish an independent surveillance oversight board with the authority to monitor, audit and report on surveillance activities. This body should comprise representatives from civil society, legal experts and technologists, and should operate in a transparent manner. Additionally, parliamentary committees should be empowered to conduct regular reviews of surveillance practices and ensure accountability. These mechanisms would help restore public trust and safeguard democratic processes.

Transparency is a cornerstone of rights-respecting surveillance. Zimbabwe’s legal framework should mandate post-surveillance notification to individuals whose communications have been intercepted, unless doing so would jeopardise an ongoing investigation. This would enable affected individuals to seek legal recourse and ensure that surveillance is not used arbitrarily or politically. Furthermore, public reporting on surveillance statistics, such as the number of warrants issued and types of data collected, should be required to promote openness and accountability.

Surveillance laws must not be weaponised to suppress political dissent or manipulate electoral outcomes. Legal reforms should explicitly prohibit surveillance targeting political candidates, activists and voters, based on political affiliation. Additionally, digital platforms used during elections must be regulated to prevent the misuse of personal data and ensure that online political engagement is protected from state surveillance.

The Zimbabwean courts are largely viewed as biased in favour of the ruling party. Progress in establishing the rule of law, constitutionalism, and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms will only occur when the government fosters a culture of respecting the judiciary’s independence and adhering to its judgments, in line with section 163(3) of the Constitution. Hence, it is ideal for citizens, interest groups and pressure groups to lodge lawsuits with the intent and purpose of constitutionally invalidating surveillance laws and practices that impinge on human rights and undermine the ethos of democratic integrity and transparency.